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THE ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT
AFTER 1991: LOOKING FORWARD TO THE
FUTURE?
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 18, 1971, President Nixon signed into law
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act' (ANCSA) in the
hopes of providing a better life for Alaska Natives.2 The
terms of the agreement provided the Native Alaskans with
fee simple' title to forty-four million acres of land through
the formation of twelve regional corporations,4 as well as
962.5 million dollars.' In addition, ANCSA provided for cer-
© 1990 by Kathleen A. Nelson.
1. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat.
668 (1971) [hereinafter ANCSA] (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629a
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
2. The term Alaska Native refers to a citizen of the United States who is a
person of one-fourth degree or more Alaska Indian (including Tsimshian Indians
not enrolled in the Metlakda Indian Community) Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or
combination thereof. 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (1982). Eskimoes and Aleuts are referred
to as Alaska Natives, although ethnologically, they are not American Indians.
However, they have always been referred to as Alaska Natives and treated as such
for purposes of federal Indian policy. D. GETCHES & C. WILKINSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 774 (2d ed. 1986). The term includes any
Native as so defined either or both of whose adoptive parents are not Natives. It
also includes, in the absence of proof of a blood quantum, any citizen of the
United States who is regarded as an Alaska Native by the Native village or Native
group of which he or she claims to be a member and whose father or mother is
(or, if deceased, was) regarded as Native by any village or group. 43 U.S.C. §
1602(b) (1982). Throughout this comment, these groups will be referred to collec-
tively as Alaska Natives, Natives, and Native Alaskans.
3. Fee simple title to land is one in which the owner is entitled to every
right in the property, including the unconditional power to transfer it during his
lifetime, and descending to his heirs and legal representatives upon his death in-
testate. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 615 (6th ed. 1990).
4. ANCSA, supra note 1. A regional corporation is defined as an Alaska
Native regional corporation established under the laws of the State of Alaska in
accordance with the provisions of ANCSA. 43 U.S.C. § 16 02(g) (1982).
5. The monetary portion of the settlement was distributed to the twelve
regional corporations through the Alaska Native Fund, established under ANCSA.
The money was to be deposited from the United States Treasury Fund to the
Alaska Native Fund over a period of twelve years. It was then to be disbursed
directly from the Alaska Native Fund to the regional corporations. 43 U.S.C. §
1605 (1982), S. REP. No. 201, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 21, repinted in 1987 U.S.
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tain restrictions regarding the alienability of corporate shares
received by Alaska Natives that are to remain in effect until
December 18, 1991. For twenty years, Alaska Natives are to
be the only shareholders in the regional corporations which
were set up for the purpose of protecting their land.6 In ex-
change, all Native claims to aboriginal title' of the land, and
all prior hunting and fishing rights that the Natives claimed
were extinguished.
Rather than achieving a seemingly complete victory,
ANCSA was riddled with shortcomings. In response to Con-
gressional recognition of these shortcomings, President Rea-
gan, in 1988, signed into law the 1991 Amendments to
ANCSA' (1991 Amendments). The 1991 Amendments pro-
vide the Natives with a variety of options to extend control
over their corporations-and thus over their land-beyond
1991, when current alienability restrictions9 limiting transfer
of the corporate shares are set to expire.
Although the 1991 Amendments are critical to the fu-
ture of Native control over the regional corporations, which
in turn control the land allotted the Natives under ANCSA,
they fall far short of their expectations. The 1991 Amend-
CODE CONG & ADMIN NEWS 3269, 3270. See also infnz note 56 and accompanying
text.
6. ANCSA, supra note 1.
7. Aboriginal title refers to a type of title based upon continuous use and
occupancy of land by aboriginal peoples. It is title held subject to the will of the
sovereign and is not protected under the United States Constitutional due process
provision. The sovereign alone has every right to completely extinguish aboriginal
tide without compensation or to convert it in whole or in part to a full title in
fee simple. H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2192, 2193.
8. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (1987) [hereinafter the 1991 Amendments] (to be codified
at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1626).
9. An alienability restriction is a provision in an instrument of conveyance
that prohibits the grantee from transferring or selling the property that is the
subject of the conveyance. Most alienability restrictions are unenforceable as
against public policy and the law's policy of free alienability of land. BLACK'S,
supra note 3, at 1314. The 1991 Amendments include provisions which restrict the
alienability of corporate shares held by Native Alaskans. Among these restraints
include the fact that if any stock is transferred in accordance with a last will and
testament or under the laws of intestacy, it shall only carry voting rights if the
new holder is a Native. In addition, if the decedent has no heirs and no will, the
stock shall revert back to the regional corporation. Another restraint includes a
provision that disallows stock or dividends to be sold, pledged for collateral, or
subject to a lien or judgment. 1991 Amendments, supra note 8.
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ments represent an attempt by Congress to preserve Native
control beyond 1991 by giving each of the twelve regional
corporations one of three options to prolong their control of
the land. However, the 1991 Amendments merely postpone a
solution to the land claims dispute. Neither ANCSA nor the
1991 Amendments accomplishes the purpose that Congress
had intended: ensuring complete and continued Native con-
trol of the corporations that control their land.'"
Congress must implement an amendment to ANCSA and
the 1991 Amendments in order to solve the problem of con-
tinued Native corporate control. An effective amendment to
the existing legislation would provide for a complete restraint
on alienation" to the subsurface" lands controlled by the
twelve regional corporations. In 1991, alienability restrictions
will expire, enabling Native Alaskans to sell their individual
shares in the regional corporations. This creates a grave
threat of takeover of every regional corporation by
non-Natives, especially by large petroleum companies who
wish to gain control of the land in order to exploit it for its
rich natural resources. Parties seeking the wealth of the rich
Alaska land will be able to pay a high price for these shares,
and thus stage a takeover. 3 If the Natives lose control over
the regional corporations, they will lose control of the land
that belongs to these corporations.
This comment proposes that Congress enact legislation
allowing each shareholder to freely alienate his shares to the
surface rights to the land, while providing that each regional
corporation retain title to the subsurface rights. If petroleum
companies and other large companies acquire these shares,
they would be free to extract the natural resources beneath
the surface, subject to certain restrictions implemented by
each corporation. The companies would then be required to
pay royalties 4 back to the corporations on the value of the
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. The term subsurface is used to describe something located or concealed
beneath the surface of the ground. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD DICTIONARY
2281 (15th ed. 1966).
13. W. HUNT, ALASKA - A BICENTENNIAL HISTORY 163 (1976).
14. A royalty is compensation for the use of property, usually natural resourc-
es, paid by a percentage of receipts from the use of the property or as a deter-
mined fixed amount per unit. BLACK'S, supra note 3, at 1330.
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resources that are extracted from the land. A provision in
the statute would provide that these restrictions will not vio-
late any laws against perpetuities.1
5
Part II of this comment examines the original intent of
Congress in passing ANCSA. It then discusses the problems
that the 1991 Amendments sought to resolve. Part III analyz-
es various problems within the 1991 Amendments. Finally,
Part IV proposes an amendment to the existing legislation
that would assure continued Native control over their corpo-
rations and thus over their land well into the future.
II. BACKGROUND
A. U.S. Acquisition of the Territory of Alaska
When the United States acquired the Territory of Alaska
from Russia in 1867, the Treaty of Cession from Russia 6
(the Treaty), gave the United States title to all lands not then
individually owned.' 7 By the terms of the Treaty, the United
States promised to treat the indigenous population in Alaska
the same as the inhabitants of the United States and its terri-
tories. 8 Native tribes, according to the Treaty, were to be
subject to such laws as the United States would implement
15. The rule against perpetuities stands for the principle that no interest in
property is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years, plus
a period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at the time of creation of
the interest. J. CRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §201, at 191 (4th ed.
1942).
16. Treaty of Cession, March 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S.
No. 301.
17. The Russian government was eager to dispose of this land, which seemed
to consist of useless rock and ice. Russia's finances were thin, and the prosperous
fur trade was diminishing. England had already colonized Canada, and the Rus-
sians were fearful of another Crimean War. Accordingly, Czar Alexander was
skeptical of having a base so close to the British, so he distanced his forces.
Meanwhile, the United States was fighting the Civil War. A Confederate vessel
reached Alaska, causing considerable damage to Union whaling vessels. When
President Lincoln heard that France and England planned to recognize the Con-
federacy, he turned to Russia, which was willing to send a fleet of vessels to the
American harbors as a friendly gesture. Russia expected the United States govern-
ment to pay for this support. When the Civil War ended, the United States was
unable to repay Russia, and agreed instead to purchase Alaska. The property
which now comprises the state of Alaska was purchased for $7,200,000, less than
two cents an acre. E. BRIGHT, ALASKA - TREASURE TROVE OF TOMORROW 14-16
(1956).
18. H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 2192-93.
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from time to time," although aboriginal title was not extin-
guished.2
With the Act of May 17, 1884,21 (the Act), Congress
stated that Alaska Natives in possession of land should not
be disturbed, and that they should be entitled to remain
living on the land. The Act did not, however, grant them
title to that land.22 Rather, Congress, through the Act, re-
served the right to grant title to the land for future legisla-
tion.23 In 1971, Congress stated,
It has been the consistent policy of the United States
[g]overnment in its dealings with Indian Tribes to grant
to them title to a portion of the lands which they occu-
pied, to extinguish the aboriginal title to the remainder
of the lands by placing such lands in the public domain,
and to pay the fair value of the titles extinguished.24
Nevertheless, before 1971, Congress had enacted no legisla-
tion that gave the Natives title to the lands which they used
and occupied.25 With little information on the distant terri-
tory, Congress deferred consideration of issues on Alaska Na-
tive land ownership for many years.
B. Land Ownership and the Discovery of Oil
In 1958, when Alaska became a state, settlement of the
Native land claims dispute was imperative. The Alaska State-
hood Act of 19586 granted the new state of Alaska the au-
thority to select and receive title to more than 103,000,000
acres of public lands that at that time were unoccupied,
clearly the largest grant of land to any new state. 7 The
land that was occupied by Native Alaskans was not granted
to the state as public land, thus the state was required to
19. H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 2193.
20. E. BRIGHT, supra note 17, at 14-16.
21. Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, 23 Stat. 24.
22. Id.
23. H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 2193-94.
24. H.R. REP., supra note 7, at 2193-94.
25. However, the Natives have maintained, as far back as 1867, that they
rightfully own this land. T. BERGER, VILLAGE JOURNEY 22 (1985).
26. The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339
(1958) (codified at 48 U.S.C. ch.2 (1982)).
27. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 775.
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disclaim any right that it had in it.28
At this time, aboriginal tide to the land had not been
extinguished. The right to grant title to the land was merely
reserved for future legislation. However, because the lands
were considered by the state to be economically advanta-
geous, 29 tension heightened between the Natives and the
state of Alaska. The Natives wished to preserve their aborigi-
nal title, whereas the state asserted that the lands were so
economically important that the state must obtain title.
The Alaska Statehood Act required the state of Alaska to
disclaim, or refuse, any right to lands to which the Native
Alaskans may have any title or right.30 This requirement
served as a bar to state selection of lands that were subject
to aboriginal title, which amounted to virtually all the land in
the state. 1
Meanwhile, the discovery of oil in Prudhoe Bay off the
Northern Coast of Alaska intensified the conflict that had
existed since the time of statehood. The discovery of oil was
the single most important catalyst to the passage of land
claims legislation. Petroleum companies needed a means to
extract the newly discovered oil, but Native title to Alaskan
land made it virtually impossible for the companies to capi-
talize on their discovery." Without the right to construct a
pipeline to extract and transport the oil, a vast quantity of
oil remained untapped. It was believed at the time that the
extraction of Alaska's oil could solve the nation's threatening
energy crisis. Thus, a quick settlement of Native claims was
imperative.33
Further, the oil companies wished to explore the newly
28. See supra note 26 at §4 and accompanying text.
29. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 775.
30. See supra note 26 at § 4 and accompanying text.
31. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 775.
32. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 776. The United States could not afford to
wait until the Native land claims dispute was resolved to tap into the Alaskan oil
reserves. It was crucial that the United States act quickly, for in 1972, the Arab
countries had cut off oil supplies to the United States, in an attempt to change
American foreign policy towards Israel. For this reason, pressure mounted to de-
velop domestic energy reserves. By the winter of 1973, the United States debated
the energy crisis, and the American citizens began to realize, for the first time,
that the end to inexpensive and unlimited energy supplies had drawn near. W.
HuNT, supra note 13, at 150.
33. C. NASKE & H. SLOTNICK, ALASKA - A HISTORY OF THE 49TH STATE 208
(1987) [hereinafter C. NASKE].
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found oil field without a barrage of legal problems. By allow-
ing for this exploration, the Alaska state government stood
to gain substantial revenue from royalties and taxes from the
oil produced. 4 This set the framework for the Natives to
offer a proposal for settling the Native claims dispute.
In 1969, a joint venture between Atlantic-Richfield, Brit-
ish Petroleum, and Humble Oil, known as the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline System (TAPS), 5 applied to the U.S. Department
of the Interior for a permit to construct a nine hundred mile
pipeline, stretching from Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic North
Slope, to Valdez on Prince William Sound."6 This applica-
tion put great pressure on Walter J. Hickel, Alaska's
then-governor, to grant the permit.3 7 However, conservation-
ist groups applied pressure to deny the permit, for fear of
hazardous environmental exploitation. 8
Despite pressure from the various conservationist groups,
the Department of the Interior and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System slowly removed legal obstacles that stood in the way
of the oil extraction project.
On September 19 (1969), the various Native villages
claiming land over which the pipeline would pass waived
their claims to the right-of-way. On September 30 the
Department of the Interior published the first of many
sets of stipulations for construction of the pipeline, said
to be the most rigid governmental controls ever imposed
34. T. MOREHOUSE, G. MCBEATH & L. LEASK, ALASKA's URBAN AND RURAL
GOVERNMENTS 132 (1984) [hereinafter T. MOREHOUSE].
35. Various companies had been exploring the North Slope for some time.
TAPS, organized for the purpose of developing the Arctic oil field, wanted to
limit its disclosure on the discovery, though it was optimistic that the oil field
would be the forerunner of additional discoveries that would make commercial
production of the oil possible. In early March, 1968, Atlantic-Richfield had an-
nounced that its discovery well flowed oil at a rate of 1,152 barrels per day. On
June 25, they announced the discovery of a second well, located approximately
seven miles southeast of the first oil field. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 248, citing
Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, August 2, 1968.
36. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 251.
37. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 251-52.
38. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 252. Included among the conservationist
groups who opposed the construction of the pipeline was the Sierra Club, who
had been urging the formation of the Gates-of-the Arctic National Park in Brooks
Range. The various conservationist groups argued that once development began,
there would be no end to the destruction of the natural beauty of the state and
the result would be irreversible harm to the fragile environment. W. HUNT, supra
note 13, at 146-47.
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on a private construction project.3 9
By mid-1970, construction plans for the pipeline were
temporarily suspended, as the oil companies realized that it
was essential for the Native land claims dispute to be re-
solved before the pipeline could be constructed.40
At the same time, the new state of Alaska began to se-
lect its lands in compliance with the Alaska Statehood Act.
From the beginning, the selection process was confronted by
resisting Native Alaskans. They were determined to retain ab-
original title to their land, as it was essential for their hunt-
ing and gathering needs. With the discovery of the 9.6 bil-
lion barrel oilfield and the need for petroleum companies
with exploration rights4 to construct a pipeline to export
and transport the oil, these petroleum companies put Native
title to land in jeopardy.42 The Natives filed blanket claims
on all public lands, yet the state was granted title to all land
chosen. Incensed, the Natives united together and protest-
ed.4
3
During the 1960's, political pressure in response to the
Statehood Act was rapidly increasing. Various Native Alaskan
groups organized themselves into political pressure groups.
In 1967, twelve regional associations had organized them-
selves into a single statewide group, the Alaska Federation of
Natives.44 The AFN recommended at their first convention
39. Implementation of these controls was to be carried out by the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) personnel in the field. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 253,
citing M. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND NATIVE LAND
CLAIMS 111 (1975).
40. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 255.
41. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
42. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 249. Various oil companies had explored the
North Slope, and the news that a substantial flow of gas was found in the Arctic
indicated the optimism of oil and gas development. Atlantic-Richfield's discovery
was a lucky one, for it was the result of a 1966 decision to randomly drill a well
on the North Slope lease that it had acquired in a state sale. C. NASKE, supra
note 33, at 248.
43. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 258.
44. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 23. The Alaska Federation of Natives
[hereinafter AFN] is a group formed by Alaska Natives to defend their rights and
claims to the benefits to which they are entitled under the United States and
Alaska state laws. The AFN also functions to educate the public about Alaska
Natives, to preserve Native culture, and to secure a just solution to the Native
claims controversy. In addition, the AFN seeks to promote the general health and
welfare of the Natives through a variety of social and health programs, and it
seeks to promote continued loyalty to Alaska and the rest of the United States.
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that the Department of the Interior freeze all disposals of
federal land pending a land claims settlement. The AFN also
persuaded the Secretary of the Interior to consult the Natives
before passing any law that attempted to settle the land
claims dispute.45
In 1968, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall, pres-
sured by the Natives,46 informally suspended the state's land
selection processing until the Native claims controversy was
resolved.47 In 1969, the freeze was made official by an exec-
utive order.4" This action taken by Stewart Udall gave impe-
tus to the idea that it was crucial that the Native land claims
dispute be settled immediately.49
C. The Implementation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act
Signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon on De-
cember 18, 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,50
(ANCSA), finally removed the lingering cloud that Native
claims had cast on all land titles in Alaska. The implementa-
tion of ANCSA was an effort to end the decade long strug-
gle of the Native Alaskans to gain title to their land. Accord-
ing to the terms of ANCSA,
The Act extinguished all claims of the Alaska Native
people to the ownership of land and hunting and fishing
rights based upon aboriginal use and occupancy, includ-
ing the Prudhoe Bay oilfield, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
corridor, and much of the land which had previously
been selected by the State of Alaska pursuant to the
554 W. STURTEVANT, INDIANS, Vol. 6 (rev. perm. ed. 1981); M. BERRY, supra note
39, at 47.
45. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 23.
46. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 23.
47. The amount of land area affected by Secretary of the Interior Stewart
Udall had greatly increased due to claims filed by the Natives that ranged from a
640 acre claim by Chilkoot Village to nearly 58 million acres claimed by the
Arctic Slope Native Association. Many of the land claims overlapped, amounting
to over 380 million acres, which is more than the total land area in the state.
Comment, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: An Illusion in the Quest for
Native Self-Determination, 66 OR. L. REV. 207 (1987); C. NASKE, supa note 33, at
198.
48. Comment, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: An Illusion in the Quest
for Native Self-Determination, 66 OR. L. REV. 207 (1987).
49. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 23.
50. ANCSA, supra note 1.
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Alaska Statehood Act.5'
To compensate the Alaska Natives, the state of Alaska
was geographically divided into twelve regional corporations,
within which were contained numerous village corpora-
tions." ANCSA provided these corporations with title to
forty-four million acres of land, amounting to a mere ten
percent of Alaska's land mass.3 The federal government,
after its passage of ANCSA and the Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA)54 In 1980, retained 197
million acres of land, amounting to roughly sixty percent of
the state. The state of Alaska was granted 124 million acres,
amounting to roughly thirty percent of the state.5"
Furthermore, to compensate the Alaska Natives for the
321 million acres of land conveyed to the state and federal
government, ANCSA established the Alaska Native Fund, into
which $962,500,000 would be deposited from the United
States Treasury Fund. The money was then to be disbursed
directly from the Alaska Native Fund to the regional corporations.5
51. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3269.
52. A village corporation is defined as "an Alaskan Native [v]illage
[c]orporation organized under the laws of tile [s]tate of Alaska as a business for
profit or nonprofit corporation to hold, invest, manage and/or distribute lands,
property, funds, and other rights and assets for and on behalf of a Native village
in accordance with the terms of [ANCSA]". 43 U.S.C. § 1602(j) (1982). The
regional corporations were organized to take title to the subsurface estate in the
lands conveyed to the village corporations, and fee simple title to the acreage
divided among the regional corporations. The Natives, by receiving shares in the
regional corporations, control all decisions that affect the land owned by their re-
gional corporation. The typical regional corporation shareholder owns one hun-
dred shares in the regional corporation. The typical village shareholder owns one
hundred shares in his village corporation, as well as one hundred shares in the
regional corporation to which the village corporation belongs. Id.; 43 U.S.C. §
1606(g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), 43 U.S.C. § 1607 (1982).
53. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 24; 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
54. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L No. 96-487, 94
Stat. 2371-2551 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606,
1631-1641 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
55. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 24.
56. 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1982). Section 1605(a) states: There is hereby estab-
lished in the United States Treasury an Alaska Native Fund into which the follow-
ing moneys shall be deposited:
(1) $462,500,000 from the general fund of the Treasury, which are au-
thorized to be appropriated according to the following schedule:
(A) $12,500,000 during the fiscal year in which this chapter
becomes effective;
(B) $50,000,000 during the second fiscal year;
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D. Native Village and Regional Corporations
ANCSA provided for the establishment of twelve region-
al corporations57 and over two hundred village corpora-
tions,58 each composed of, as far as practicable, Natives
sharing a common heritage and a common culture. In order
to qualify for benefits under ANCSA, the Alaska Natives
were required to organize the regional corporations under
the "business for profit" laws of the state of Alaska.59 The
two hundred village corporations within the boundaries of
the regional corporations are not subsidiaries of the regional
corporations, rather, they are independent. Those who live in
villages defined by ANCSA received stock in both their vil-
lage corporation and the regional corporation to which it is
situated. Because most Natives do not live in villages, not all
shareholders of the regional corporations own shares in the
village corporations.6" Natives living in villages were given
the option of forming a nonprofit corporation 6 1 or a
for-profit corporation. A nonprofit corporation would be
unable to enjoy the monetary benefits of ANCSA " Because
forming a for-profit corporation would entitle the villages to
(C) $70,000,000 during each of the third, fourth, and fifth
fiscal years;
(D) $40,000,000 during the period beginning July 1, 1976, and
ending September 30, 1976; and
(E) $30,000,000 during each of the next five fiscal years, for
transfer to the Alaska Native Fund in the fourth quarter of each fis-
cal year.
(2) Four percent interest per annum, which is authorized to be appro-
priated, on any amount authorized to be appropriated by this para-
graph that is not appropriated within six months after the fiscal year
in which payable.
(3) $500,000,000 pursuant to the revenue sharing provisions of section
1608 of this title.
57. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 52.
59. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982).
60. Natives who do not live in a village and are nevertheless identified with a
region become shareholders only in that regional corporation. These Natives are
known as at-large shareholders. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 24.
61. A non-profit corporation is one that is organized for other than
profit-making purposes, and one in which no part of its earnings is distributed to
its members, directors, or officers. Rather, the profits are kept within the corpo-
ration itself. BLACK'S, supra note 3, at 1056.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (1982).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the monetary benefits of ANCSA, every village chose to form
a for-profit corporation."
ANCSA required the Secretary of the Interior to prepare
a roll of all Alaska Natives who were alive on December 18,
1971, the date of ANCSA's enactment.64 These Natives were
each given one-hundred shares of stock in their
geographically-defined regional corporation. Those residing in
a village corporation were given one hundred shares in their
village corporation as well. This was a one time distribution
of shares. Those born after December 18, 1971 are only able
to receive these shares through inheritance. 65
Natives not permanently residing in the state were al-
lowed to join a thirteenth corporation located in Seattle,
Washington.66 This corporation is known as the Thirteenth
Regional Corporation.67 Shareholders of this corporation
did not receive title to land, but received a pro-rata share of
the $962.5 million,6" which was split between the thirteen
corporations in an amount based upon Native enrollment.69
The Alaska Native Fund 7' distributed the monetary portion
of the settlement to each regional corporation, according to
its number of shareholders. ANCSA provided that the United
States Treasury was to distribute $462.5 million to the re-
gional corporations over an eleven year period. The remain-
ing $500 million was to come from a revenue-sharing plan7'
63. T. BERCER, supra note 25, at 25.
64. 43 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982). A total of 80,239 Alaska Natives claiming to
have at least one-quarter Native blood were placed on the roll. S. REP., supra note
5, at 3270.
65. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (1982).
66. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(c) (1982).
67. Id.
68. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 24. See also supra note 56 and accompanying
text. The monetary portion of the settlement was distributed annually to the re-
gional corporations through the Alaska Native Fund over a period of twelve years.
Each regional corporation was required to distribute a portion of the cash settle-
ment to individual shareholders in the regional corporations, as well as a portion
to the village corporations. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3270.
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (1982).
70. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
71. The revenue-sharing plan provided that the $500 million was to come
from a 2% royalty on production of minerals including oil, and a 2% royalty on
all rentals and bonuses from the land in Alaska that was granted to the state of
Alaska in the Alaska Statehood Act, as well as land within the state to which the
federal government retained title. This land, however, excluded Naval Petroleum
Reserve No. 4 on the North Slope. The terms of ANCSA further require the
272 [Vol. 31
ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS
that covers profits from all minerals, including oil, that would
be extracted from the Alaska land retained by both the fed-
eral government and the Alaska state government. Further-
more, each regional corporation was to distribute among the
village corporations included within its boundaries "no less
than 50 percent of its share of the $962.5 million monetary
award, as well as 50 percent of all revenues received from
the subsurface estate."
72
Distribution of land awarded to the Natives under
ANCSA had also begun by mid-1972. Villages were to be the
first to pick the land, choosing out of 100 million acres set
aside to be allotted to them based upon enrollment.7 In
total, 22 million acres were to be chosen by the villages.
74
Those villages with an enrollment of between twenty-five and
ninety-nine would receive 69,120 acres.75 Those with an en-
rollment of one-hundred or more were allotted 161,280
acres. 76 The villages were to make these selections over a
three year period. After the village corporations made their
selection, the regional corporations would make their selec-
tion over a four year period.77 The settlement provided that
the village corporations held fee simple title only to the sur-
face lands.78 The regional corporations, on the other hand,
owned fee simple title to the surface and subsurface area of
the regional corporations, and the subsurface area of the
land belonging to the village corporations.79
Congress, through the enactment of ANCSA, recognized
that a fair and rapid settlement of all Native claims disputes
was vital. It intended that the settlement be accomplished
equal division among all regional corporations of seventy percent of all revenues
received by each regional corporation from timber or from subsurface natural
resources, including oil. The Thirteenth Regional Corporation was not to partici-
pate in the timber and subsurface natural resources revenue division. 43 U.S.C. §
1608 (1982).
72. C. NAsKE, supra note 33, at 209. However, this provision does not apply
to revenues received from the regional corporations' investments in business ven-
tures. Id.
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1613 (1982).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (1982).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1613 (1982).
79. Id. See also text of note 52.
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rapidly and efficiently."0 By 1987, however, nearly nine mil-
lion acres of land still had not been transferred to the re-
gional corporations from the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment."' This is in part due to the complex process of trans-
ferring land to the corporations. 2 A greater cause of this
delay is, however, the tremendous expense incurred by each
regional corporation stemming from litigation involving the
land settlement portion of ANCSA. 3
E. ANCSA Before 1991
Title to the land selected by each regional corporation
was received in fee simple.84 However, ANCSA provided for
certain restrictions affecting control of the corporations that
hold title to this land. Each corporate share given the Natives
contains a restraint on alienation effective until December
18, 1991, twenty years after the passage of ANCSA. 5 Be-
tween December 18, 1971 and December 18, 1991, the
80. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (1982).
81. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 215. The Bureau of Land Management is a
federal agency formed to manage the national resource lands and their resources,
amounting to some 450,000,000 acres. It also administers tire mineral resources
connected with acquired lands and the submerged lands of the Outer Continental
Shelf. The Bureau of Land Management was established on July 16, 1946, with
the consolidation of the General Land Office (created in 1812), and the Grazing
Service (formed in 1934). BLACK'S, supra note 3, at 197.
82. For example, because not enough lands were available for regional and
village corporation selections within the Cook Inlet region, Congress, in 1975,
passed an omnibus act which became law in 1976 and was known as the Omnibus
Act of 1976. The purpose of this legislation was to clarify the intent of Congress
in passing ANCSA, and to rectify some injustices that stemmed from its passage.
The Omnibus Act authorized a complicated exchange of lands among the Cook
Inlet Region, Inc., the state of Alaska, and the United States, as a means of
satisfying the Cook Inlet Region's land entitlement under ANCSA. The Omnibus
Act spelled out various requirements that were to be satistied before land ex-
changes could be made by the executive branch of the federal government. 1976
Alaska Sess. Laws 19, 1976 Alaska Sess. Laws 240.
83. M. BERRY, supra note 39, at 240-41. ThIe terms of ANCSA are very ambig-
uous, and, as such, much litigation ensued. Millions of dollars have been spent on
the litigation of disputes. Lawsuits have ranged from the delineation of
land-selection boundaries between regions, and eligibility of tribal groups to be
called village corporations, to splitting of revenues between corporations fiom the
sale of timber and mineral resources, and proxy battles within tile corporations. T.
BERGER, supra note 25, at 31.
84. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 778. See also supra note 3 and accompany-
ing text.
85. ANCSA, supra note 1.
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shares cannot be sold, pledged for collateral, or made subject
to a lien or judgment."6 Similarly, the stock contains voting
rights only if owned by a Native. 7 This voting restraint op-
erates to restrict the voting rights of non-Natives who acquire
the shares through inheritance. However, Natives who ac-
quire shares through inheritance receive voting rights.
In addition, during this initial twenty year period, Native
regional and village corporations are not subject to state and
local property taxes on these lands, unless they are leased or
developed."M Originally, the period for tax exemption was to
expire on December 18, 1991, "[b]ut in 1980 ANILCA ex-
tended the exemption period to (a) 20 years from the vesting
of the title pursuant to ANCSA or (b) the date of issuance of
an interim conveyance or patent, whichever is earlier." 9
On December 18, 1991, ANCSA requires that all shares
be called in.9" New stock will be issued on January 1, 1992
which will be devoid of all current alienability restrictions.
The shares will represent title in fee simple, and they will be
freely alienable by each shareholder without the consent of
any other shareholder. Similarly, they may be pledged as
collateral or sold whenever and to whomever the shareholder
so desires.9' Again, those born after December 18, 1971 are
ineligible to receive the new shares of stock.92
F. Flaws Within ANCSA
The U.S. Senate, before the passage of the 1991 Amend-
ments, acknowledged four major problems with the future of
ANCSA: First, Congress recognized that, by 1991, the stock-
holders in both the regional and village corporations will not
have gained sufficient experience to enable them to function
as corporate shareholders controlling a business entity when
their stock will become freely alienable.93
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also supra note 9
and accompanying text.
87. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
88. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (1982); D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 778.
89. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 778.
90. Note, Settling the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 38 STAN. L. REv. 227,
228 (1985).
91. I&
92. 1991 Amendments, supia note 8.
93. The passage of ANCSA has virtually destroyed the Alaska Natives' subsis-
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Second, Congress noted that the shareholders will not
have enough money and resources to remain economically
capable of surviving, and, as a result, the Natives' shares will
be lost through insolvency.94 Third, the Senate recognized
that the Natives are concerned that those born after Decem-
ber 18, 1971 are not shareholders in the corporations, and
thus cannot participate in decisions that will affect the future
of the land. In 1991, it is projected that the number of
non-shareholder Natives will equal that of the sharehold-
ers. 5 This change is certain to create division and conflict
within the family and the community.
Finally, while some regional corporations are stable, oth-
er corporations, especially the village corporations, are on the
way to becoming insolvent. 6 These struggling village corpo-
rations may either lose their shares involuntarily or may be
forced to sell their stock to avoid bankruptcy. 7 Although
tence economy, the Natives' hunting and fishing culture which has been a part of
their society for many generations. Natives now must learn to think and live as
non-natives if their corporations are to survive. They constantly struggle to save
their culture and to make a smooth transition into society. T. BERCER, supra note
25, at 19. Furthermore, many Native shareholders will not have recieved sufficient
experience in handling corporate activities. Many believe that since the shares of
stock represent their personal stake in the land claims settlement, this inexperi-
ence will only harm them when their shares may be sold on the open market. S.
REP., supra note 5, at 3270-71.
94. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3271. Village corporations with one-hundred
shareholders received approximately $80,000 from the initial distribution of allocat-
ed funds. The Alaska Native Foundation has calculated that it costs roughly
$70,000 annually for a village corporation to conduct typical corporate duties and
functions. Over ten years, most villages have received a total of less than $200,000
from the Alaska Native Fund, which is an insufficient amount to support, the
rising operating budgets of the village corporations. A study carried out in 1974
by the Department of the Interior calculated that villages with fewer than
six-hundred shareholders would have insufficient capital to succeed. Of over
two-hundred village corporations, only eight have more than six-hundred
shareholders. Most of these village corporations, therefore have been grossly
undercapitalized since their formation. BERCER, supa note 25, at 163.
95. BERCER, supra note 25, at 99. Congress conferred shares on all Natives
claiming one-quarter Native blood who were living on December 18, 1971, the
date of ANCSA's enactment. These Natives were to be the only shareholders to
recieve shares. All Natives born after December 18, 1971 were excluded from the
issuance. Many believe that, within a profit-earning corporate system, it is impracti-
cal to have a continuous process of enrolling infants to share in the issuance, as
this would reduce the value of existing stockholders' shares. Id.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. Telephone interview with Margaret Nelson, Lecturing Professor of Anthro-
pology, University of Washington, (December 22, 1989). See also supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
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some regional corporations have succeeded in advancing the
Natives needs, some village corporations, undercapitalized to
begin with, have never received a significant sum of mon-
ey.9 8
G. The 1991 Amendments to ANCSA
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments
of 1987"9 which came to be known as the 1991 Amend-
ments, was signed into law by President Reagan on February
3, 1988. The purpose of Congress in enacting the 1991
Amendments was to provide each regional corporation with
several options in order to ensure continued ownership and
control of the lands granted them under ANCSA.' Con-
gress restated in the 1991 Amendments its policy reasons for
enacting ANCSA in 1971, namely, the need for a rapid, fair
and just settlement of the Native land claims dispute.''
Congress realized that it was time that ANCSA was amended
to ensure the Alaska Natives continued participation in deci-
sions affecting the future of their land."0 2
Section 1606 of the 1991 Amendments authorizes each
regional corporation to amend its articles of incorporation to
authorize the issuance of stock other than Settlement Com-
mon Stock. The new stock will be called Replacement Com-
mon stock. 0 3 Each regional corporation may choose to
provide whether or not the stock contains such rights as
voting rights, dividend rights, and liquidation preferenc-
es. 0 4 The regional corporations are also free to restrict the
issuance of such stock to include only those born after De-
cember 18, 1971, Native elders,'0 5 and those who were eli-
gible but did not receive settlement common stock in 1971,
98. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
99. 1991 Amendments, supra note 8.
100. 1991 Amendments, supra note 8.
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (1982).
102. 1991 Amendments, supra note 8.
103. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Settlement Common
Stock and Replacement Common Stock definitions distinguish the restricted and
unrestricted stock that ANCSA originally envisioned would be issued by Native
corporations from the other forms of stock that the amendments authorize the
corporations to issue. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3274.
104. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3275.
105. A Native elder is defined as one who has attained the age of sixty-five.
43 U.S.C. § 1606(g)(IXB) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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because they had not enrolled in the corporation for which
they were eligible. 6
The 1991 Amendments also allow each regional corpora-
tion to amend its bylaws to include a right of first refus-
al. 07 This gives the corporation or a member of an individ-
ual shareholder's family the first right to buy his or her
stock, and so to keep stock ownership in the hands of the
selling shareholder's family or the corporation itself.' Sec-
tion 1607(h)(2) of the 1991 Amendments provides that if a
shareholder should die with no heirs, the stock will transfer
back to the issuing corporation and will automatically be
void. ' 9 This provision also provides that "[t]he issuing Re-
gional Corporation shall have the right to purchase at fair
value Settlement Common Stock transferred pursuant to
applicable laws of intestate succession to a person not a Na-
tive or a descendant of a Native after February 3, 1988."" °
In order to exercise this right, the corporation must first
amend its articles to include this provision, and must also
give the recipient fair notice"' and a chance to first offer
106. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
107. Id. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(3)(D) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Section
1606(h)(3)(D) states: Prior to the date on which alienability restrictions terminate,
a [r]egional [c]orporation may amend its articles of incorporation to impose upon
Replacement Common Stock one or more of the following:
(i) a restriction denying voting rights to any holder of Replacement
Common Stock who is not a Native or a descendant of a Native;
(ii) a restriction granting the [riegional [c]orporaiion, or the [r]egional
[c]orporation and members of the shareholder's immediate family who
are Natives or descendants of Natives, the first right to purchase, on
reasonable terms, the Replacement Common Stock of the shareholder
prior to the sale or transaction of such stock (other than a transfer
by will or intestate succession) to any other party, including a transfer
in satisfaction of a lien, writ of attachment, judgment execution,
pledge, or other encumbrance; and
(iii) any other term, restriction, limitation, or provision authorized by
the laws of the [s]tate.
108. Id.
109. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
110. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
111. Id. Section 1606(h)(2)(B) provides that the regional corporation has the
right to purchase such stock if the corporation amends its articles to authorize
such purchase, and gives the person receiving the stock written notice of its intent
to purchase within ninety days after the date that the corporation either deter-
mines the decedent's heirs in accordance with the laws of the state of Alaska, or
receives notice that such heirs have been determined, whichever occurs later, and
the person receiving the stock fails to transfer the stock back to the corporation
within sixty days of receiving this notice.
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the stock to a Native. If a non-Native receives the shares, he
or she receives no voting power."'
Included within the 1991 Amendments is a settlement
trust option.'" Under this option, a regional corporation
may transfer a portion of its assets out of the corporate form
by conveying them to a trust in accordance with the laws of
the state of Alaska." 4 In order to implement a trust, ap-
proval of the shareholders in the form of a resolution is
necessary to convey all or substantially all of the assets, in-
cluding stock, into the trust."5 However, this option pro-
vides that no subsurface estate in land may be conveyed into
the settlement trust."' This provision further states that
each regional corporation establishing a settlement trust shall
have exclusive authority to appoint and remove trustees.
11 7
Congress, in providing each corporation the opportunity
to implement a trust, intended to promote the health, educa-
tion, and welfare of the trust's beneficiaries, and to preserve
Native heritage and culture.1 18 These state-chartered trusts
have no power to transfer lands and are not subject to the
rule against perpetuities." 9
The 1991 Amendments further amend ANCSA to re-
quire that if any amendment shall be adopted by a regional
corporation, there must be an amendment in its articles of
incorporation that allows for this. 20 Should the board of
directors of a regional corporation initially approve an
amendment to the articles of incorporation, the proposed
amendment must then be presented to the shareholders to
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(a)(2) (1982 & Stpp. V 1987). Congress provided,
however, that timber resources may be transferred to a trust, but they may not be
commercially harvested. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
117. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(2) (1982 & Stipp. V 1987).
118. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
119. 43 U.S.C. § 1629e(b)(4) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The establishment of a
trust is intended by Congress to be a land protection option, used to permanently
insulate land and other assets transferred to a trust from business risks undertak-
en by the corporation. Thus, Congress believed that it was essential to include a
provision providing that the rule against perpetuities will not be violated. S. REP.,
supra note 5, at 3285.
120. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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be voted on at the next shareholder meeting."' In order
to approve an amendment to the articles of incorporation, a
majority of the total voting power of the corporation is nec-
essary.12
2
H. Options to Preserve Native Control Over Corporations
A significant provision of the 1991 Amendments provid-
ed each regional corporation with a choice between three
options to extend the restrictions on alienability 2 that now
expire on December 18, 1991. These three options are the
opt-out procedure,'24 the recapitalization plan,12 5 and the
opt-in procedure.' 26
Under the opt-out procedure, a regional corporation is
permitted to extend the current alienability restrictions by
amending its articles of incorporation. 127 This procedure al-
lows the corporation to either set a specific date when the
restrictions will expire, or specify that expiration of the re-
strictions will be automatic upon the occurrence of a certain
event, for example, a vote by the shareholders at a specified
date in the future.12 1 Should a regional corporation decide
to implement the opt-out procedure, it must be voted upon
once before December 18, 1991.129
An alternative procedure available to each corporation is
the recapitalization plan.' Should a regional corporation
adopt this plan, it must amend its articles of incorporation to
allow for this option.' s ' The objective of the recapitalization
plan is to restructure the corporation by extending the alien-
121. Id.
122. The articles of incorporation may be amended, however, to require a
number greater than a majority of the total voting power of the corporation, but
this number may never be more than a two-thirds majority of all voting shares. 43
U.S.C. § 1629b(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
124. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
126. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
127. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(b)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text.
128. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
129. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(b)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
130. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text. Moreover, there shall be no limit on the number of
amendments to extend alienability restrictions. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3282.
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ability restrictions on the shares for a period of time up to
fifty years." 2 Like the opt-out approach, a certain date for
the expiration of restrictions may be specified, or it may be
determined by the occurrence of a specified event (subject to
a later majority vote to remove the restrictions).13 Under
the recapitalization plan, a regional corporation is authorized
to issue different classes of stock, which may carry different
voting rights.3 4 The shareholders of the regional corpora-
tions wishing to implement this plan must approve it by a
simple majority on or before December 18, 199115
Yet another procedure implemented by the 1991
Amendments is the opt-in approach. 6 By implementing
this option, a board of directors may vote to extend
alienability restrictions if they voted to do so not later than
February 3, 1989, one year after the passage of the 1991
Amendments.' 7 This option is open to all regional corpo-
rations and any village corporation within the Bristol Bay and
Aleut Regional corporations. If the board of directors adopt-
ed this resolution before February 3, 1989 and a simple ma-
jority of shareholders approved, the restrictions on alienabili-
ty will extend for any specified period of time up to fifty
years.'3 If the board of directors does not adopt this reso-
lution and the shareholders do not vote on it, the restric-
tions will automatically terminate on December 18, 1991.1" 9
Each of these-plans allows the Alaska Natives to extend
the current alienability restrictions on their shares of stock.
The 1991 Amendments are an attempt by Congress to en-
sure continued Native control over their corporations that
hold title to the land granted them through the passage of
132. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(I)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
133. Id.
134. The stock issued by a corporation that has adopted a recapitalization plan
may include different types of stock such as voting alienable common stock. 43
U.S.C. § 160 6 (g) (1982 & Supp. V 1987), 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(cXl)(A) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
135. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also supra note 122
and accompanying text. The rejection of an amendment to terminate alienability
restrictions will not preclude subsequent votes on the issue prior to December 18,
1991. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3282.
136. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
138. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
139. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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ANCSA. Though the corporations have several options from
which to choose, there is skepticism and uncertainty as to
whether any single option will provide the Natives with the
protection that they need.
The issue of continued Native control over the corpora-
tions and thus over the land that was granted to the corpora-
tions in 1971 is far from over. The following analysis will
discuss the reasons why ANCSA has failed to meet its goal
by examining the failure of the regional corporations. It will
then analyze the opt-out approach, the recapitalization plan,
and the opt-in approach made available to each regional
corporation through the 1991 Amendments, and discuss why
these options do not fulfill the original. intent of Congress.
The focus will then shift to the examination of a proposal
which will assure continued Native control over the regional
corporations that hold title to the land, thus fulfilling the
aim of Congress in settling the Native land claims dispute.
III. ANALYSIS
Although Native control over the regional corporations
that hold title to land granted them may be extended
through the implementation of the opt-out procedure, the
recapitalization plan, or the opt-in procedure, no option is a
complete solution, for none of these options solves the
threatening problem. Rather, they merely postpone it until a
future date. Many of these undercapitalized corporations
must devise a plan to extend Native control permanently, in
the most efficient method, and as quickly as possible. Con-
tinued Native control over the regional corporations, and
thus over the land which rightfully belongs to the corpora-
tions, is the key to the preservation of the Natives' identity.
With the passage of ANCSA, Congress bestowed shares
of stock on all eligible Natives alive on the date of enact-
ment,140 to the exclusion of all others. Natives born after
December 18, 1971 do not share as full partners in the Na-
tive claims settlement with those born before the passage of
ANCSA. In order to participate in the settlement, those born
after December 18, 1971 may only receive shares in the cor-
140. 43 U.s.c. § 1604 (1982).
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poration through inheritance.14" ' Inclusion of the younger
Natives in this manner will 'not take place for some time.
This concern has a polarizing effect on Native village life and
family life as well.' Some members of the family and vil-
lage are shareholders, while others are not, by virtue of their
date of birth. "Testimony submitted to the Committee pro-
jects that in 1991 the number of Alaska Natives born after
the enactment of ANCSA will equal one-half the number of
Alaska Natives currently included in the settlement." 43 As
the years pass, the number is bound to increase.
More important, however, is the fact that December 18,
1991 will soon be upon us. The regional corporations have
been in operation for nearly twenty years and are now firmly
established in Alaska's economy. Though many problems
exist, each corporation has in some way contributed to diver-
sifying Alaska's economy, chiefly through outside invest-
ment. 144 Part of the reason for these large corporate invest-
ments is the fact that ANCSA provided a twenty year tax
delay on all undeveloped Native lands. 145 Because this cre-
ated an incentive to keep their own lands undeveloped, many
corporations have invested their capital in outside sources.
After 1991, however, this tax benefit will no longer be avail-
able. 14  Much of the undeveloped land will become taxable
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
142. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3271.
143. S. REP., supra note 5, at 3271.
144. C. NASKE, supra note 33, at 214. Most corporations have invested capital
into a variety of holdings. For example, Doyon, Ltd. has invested a large sum of
money into a historic hotel and shopping complex in Lahaina, Maui, Hawaii. The
Bristol Bay Native Corporation acquired Peter Pan Seafoods and tile Anchorage
Westward Hotel, the largest purchase of any regional corporation. The purchase
price amounted to approximately $18 million. The Sealaska Corporation bought
the Alaska Brick Company of Anchorage,. which includes a concrete-block opera-
tion, a barge operation, and an import-export b~ranch which receives building
products from Japan. This new acquisition raises a revenue of between $11 mil-
lion and $12 million a year. Id.
145. Congress amended ANCSA in 1980 to extend the tax exemption period
for undeveloped land from twenty years to twenty years after the date on which
the corporation received title to the land. Since many corporations received their
land after 1971, their tax exemption period is extended until twenty years after
this date. Most of the land will become taxable in the 1990s, however. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1620 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
146. Because of the twenty year tax benefit for this undeveloped land, Section
21(d) of ANCSA implicitly assumes that twenty years after the date of conveyance
to the corporations, all undeveloped land belonging to tile regional corporations
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in the 1990s, encouraging widespread land development by
the regional corporations. A monetary incentive to keep the
land undeveloped no longer exists.
This poses a great problem for those [v]illages and/or
[r]egional [c]orporations which wish to retain large por-
tions of their land in an undeveloped state so that their
shareholders may continue to live there on a subsistence
basis. If this is the [n]ative [c]orporation's decision, then
the land will be producing no income, and after twenty
years a substantial tax might force either the sale of the
land or its appropriation by the [g]overnment. 147
ANCSA further provided that if regional corporations
explore and extract subsurface resources, permission from
the individual village corporation where the land is located is
necessary. 14' Because the regional corporations are de-
signed to operate at a profit, it will be necessary for each
corporation to develop its land through exploration. The
villages, on the other hand, wish to preserve their land for
subsistence economies. The continued development of the
land by the regional corporations perhaps cannot recede
after 1991, and the conflict that presently exists between the
regional corporations and the village corporations will extend
well into the future.14 9
Although these concerns are significant, the greatest
threat to continued Native control over the regional corpora-
tions that control their land will stem from large petroleum
and other companies wishing to gain control of the land for
the value of its rich natural resources. If the large petroleum
companies and various other companies succeed in acquiring
including tens of millions of acres of land which is only valuable as a wildlife
habitat needed to support the continuation of the Native Alaskan subsistence
economy, will be sufficiently adapted into the non-Native business economy to
generate sufficient revenue to pay taxes on this land. If the land is not sufficiently
integrated, ANCSA assumes that the Native corporation which owns the land will
be able to pay the property taxes with money earned from other sources. S. REP.,
supra note 5, at 3271. In addition, the land belonging to the reional corporations
is not protected from the possibility of being seized to pay creditors in bankrupt-
cy proceedings, nor is it immune from being lost through adverse possession. Id.
147. Shively, An Assessment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, in MANUAL
OF INDIAN LAw L-9 (1977).
148. ANCSA, supra note 1.
149. F. COHEN, FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 756-57
(1982).
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the land, it will be exploited for profit. Although the regional
corporations, like outside investors, may wish to develop the
land through exploration, the extraction process by Native
controlled corporations may be less harmful than extraction
by non-Native controlled corporations. Prudent and conserva-
tive regulations are more likely to be implemented by Native
controlled corporations, as most Natives have a strong inter-
est in preserving the land for their descendants.
More importantly, however, is the fact that the Natives
will be unable to regain ownership of the land, and it will be
eternally lost. If the petroleum companies rightfully own the
land and utilize it profitably through continued extraction of
natural resources, they will be unwilling to sell it back to the
Natives. If, however, the companies strip the land of all sub-
surface resources, the land will be without value, for it will
be useless for any purpose.
Similarly, profitable regional corporations may be the
targets of a takeover bid by investors seeking to enter new
markets. Unprofitable corporations may not be safe either, as
they may find it necessary to liquidate their assets in order
to avoid insolvency. Shareholders may sell their shares at
distress prices if they see little prospect of significant capital
gains or dividends. 5
None of the options given to the regional corporations
to extend alienability restrictions are sufficient to avoid these
shortcomings. ANCSA and the 1991 Amendments have large-
ly failed to achieve what Congress had intended in settling
the Native land claims dispute: a fair and equitable settle-
ment in order to preserve Native control over the corpora-
tions that hold title to the land given them through ANCSA.
A. Corporate Failure
At the time ANCSA was enacted, little thought was given
to the existing way of life of the Native Alaskans. Congress
found it easy to set up a law that provided for the land
awarded to the Natives to become privately owned through
corporations. However, the Natives have never functioned in
societies like those of non-Natives in the rest of the United
States. The only economy with which they are normally famil-
150. D. GETCHES, supra note 2, at 817.
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iar is their subsistence economy. With the implementation of
the various corporations, the Natives were thrown into a
completely foreign system. If the Natives wished to preserve
title to their land, they quickly had to learn to function as
corporations, which was a completely new idea to the Na-
tives.
Similarly, what seemed to be an enormous amount of
money was in reality very modest. Because of the pipeline
construction, the national inflation had accelerated in the
state of Alaska, and the spending power of the dollar had
decreased by about one-third by the time the Natives had
received the monetary portion of their settlement.
On a statewide basis, ANCSA's cash settlement amounted
to about $12,000 for each shareholder, but individual
Natives did not receive this sum. The at-large sharehold-
ers, who do not live in the villages, each received $6,525.
Most village shareholders received a total of $375; but
after 1976, the Alaska Native Fund made no further pay-
ments to villagers.'5
B. The Opt-out Procedure
Congress, realizing the urgent need for extension of the
alienability restrictions included in the provisions of ANCSA,
gave each regional corporation the option of implementing
an opt-out procedure.'52 Under this approach, all current
alienability restrictions will remain in effect unless a majority
of shareholders, before December 18, 1991, votes to remove
such restrictions.'5 If the shareholders vote to remove the
restrictions, the shares will become freely alienable.
Although this proposal may seem to solve the problem,
in reality, it falls far short of its goal. Making the option to
remove restrictions available to the individual corporations
could prove to be disastrous. Many regional corporations
may effectuate this option, because the dire economic posi-
tion of the corporations will force the Native shareholders to
invite outside investment in the corporation, in order to
151. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 27.
152. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
153. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also iifra note 160 and
accompanying text.
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generate income from within the system.
Since most of the corporations have not regularly paid
out dividends, the shareholders have owned the stock in the
regional corporations for nearly twenty years with no realiz-
able benefits. When the restrictions are lifted in 1991, the
threatening possibility of a simple majority of shareholders
who are willing to sell their stock will arise, as a demand for
the stock already exists. If the Natives need or want the in-
come, there is no incentive to restrain them from selling
their shares. As one Native believed, "[s]ometimes people
believe in a general principle and yet .. .when they're in a
tough spot, they might do something because they just don't
have any choice."
1 54
Constant tension exists regarding the concerns of the
Natives. On the one hand, the Alaska Natives wish to pre-
serve their ancestral land for future generations. They can
only accomplish this goal by maintaining Native control over
the corporations that own the land. On the other hand, the
Natives feel that these corporations were set up for their aid
and benefit. Many Natives believe that a corporation going
increasingly into debt cannot benefit its shareholders. Most
have received no benefits from their regional corpora-
tion. 55 For these reasons, many wish to sell their stock
while the value still remains.
The opt-out procedure creates a struggle within the cor-
porations, between those shareholders who wish to maintain
154. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 106 (quoting Alaska Native Eunice Nesseth,
Kodiak).
155. Each individual regional corporation has a different style of operation and
diverse forms of investment, as well as different amounts of legal fees. For exam-
ple, the Cook Inlet Region, Inc. has paid a tremendous amount in legal fees, as it
has encountered difficulty in the land selection process. However, it has invested
in many successful hotels and warehouses, and has participated in joint-venture
projects to develop coal lands. The Calista Corporation and Ahtna, Inc. have both
used their money wisely, investing it in hotels and negotiating joint ventures for
pipeline work. Doyon Ltd., the largest regional corporation, has concentrated on
developing natural resources, and has constantly operated at a profit. On the
other hand, the Southeast Alaska Corporation has been a cautious investor,
though still operating at a profit. In 1980, Ahtna, Inc., Aleut Corporation, Arctic
Slope Regional Corporation, Bristol Bay Regional Corporation, Cook Inlet Region,
Inc., Doyon, Ltd., NANA Regional Corporation, and Sealaska Corporation have all
operated at a profit. The'Bering Straits Native Corporation, Calista Corporation,
Chugach Natives, Inc., Koniag, Inc., and the Thirteenth Regional Corporation have
all operated at a loss, ranging from ($245,000), to ($7.3 million). T. MOREIIOUSE,
supra note 34, at 190-91.
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control over their corporation and thus preserve the land for
future generations, and those who would prefer to sell their
shares because their corporation has never benefitted
them.'56 Perhaps if more corporations succeed and begin
to pay dividends, the shareholders would gain a renewed
faith and confidence in their corporation, and would not sell
their shares to outside investors.
However, even if the corporations prospered and even if
dividends were paid out, there will always be a reason for
some Natives to wish to sell their stock. The most important
reason stems from the 1971 passage of ANCSA itself. The
Alaskan Natives have not acquired sufficient experience in
handling corporate activities and the ways of a culture to
which they were largely unaccustomed before 1971. Because
the Natives belong primarily to subsistence economies, they
have not functioned and cannot be expected to function with
the attitudes of shareholders of profit-making corporations. It
is for precisely this reason that the corporations have failed.
If a simple majority of shareholders lets the option ex-
pire because they believe the corporations have failed them,
Native control of that corporation will be forever lost. This
loss of Native control frustrates the entire purpose behind
ANCSA and the 1991 Amendments: a rapid and efficient
settlement in order to preserve Native control over the cor-
porations that hold title to the land given them through
ANCSA. If a majority votes to implement the opt-out proce-
dure, the same majority will themselves sell their shares. This
vote will put a majority of the stock, and hence the control
over decisions that affect the land, into the hands of new
owners.
It is very likely that these new owners will be non-Native
individuals or large non-Native controlled corporations, espe-
cially petroleum companies. Because these investors are gen-
erally more economically sophisticated than are the Natives,
both individual investors and large corporations will be will-
ing and able to offer a high price for the shares. In addition,
Natives discouraged by the corporate system may sell their
shares at distress prices. 5
Furthermore, the opt-out approach could create disparity
between regional corporations. Because each of the twelve
156. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 104-05.
157. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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regional corporations"' has the option of implementing
this procedure, some corporations may adopt it while others
may not. The corporations operating at a significant loss will
be most likely to implement it. Therefore, after 1991, the
result may be that some corporations will have continued
complete Native control, while others may not.
Most Native leaders feel that the sale of land should be
the exception and not the rule. Many strongly feel that the
land allotted them should never be sold. If individual region-
al corporations allow non-Natives to buy control of Native
corporations, the Native land claims settlement would then
become a non-Native land claims settlement.'59 Clearly, this
will affect all regional corporations, whether or not they
choose to implement the opt-out procedure. Because the
opt-out procedure may be voted upon generally every two
years, 6 ° there is the additional danger of constant change
within the statewide regional corporate system. This uncer-
tainty in itself undermines the original goal of Congress,
namely, a rapid and efficient settlement of the land claims
dispute. 16'
Once the shareholders have voted on and approved an
amendment before December 18, 1991,'the corporation may
158. The Thirteenth Regional Corporation does not share in the land portion
of the settlement under ANCSA. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 24. Because of this,
these options do not apply to it.
159. Shively, supra note 147, at .,8.
160. § 1629c(b) provides that only one amendment to terminate alienability re-
strictions may be considered and voted on prior to December 18, 1991. If an
amendment to terminate alienability restrictions is considered, voted on, and
rejected prior to December 18, 1991, then subsequent amendments to terminate
alienability restrictions after December 18, 1991 shall be voted on not earlier than
five years after the rejection of the most recently rejected amendment to termi-
nate restrictions if the amendment was submitted by the board of directors of the
corporation on its own motion. If an amendment was submitted by the board of
directors of the corporation pursuant to a shareholder petition, then a new
amendment may be voted on not earlier than two years after the most recently
rejected amendment to terminate restrictions. If no amendment to terminate
alienability restrictions is considered and voted on prior to December 18, 1991,
then amendments to terminate alienability restrictions after December 18, 1991
shall be considered and voted on not more than once every five years in the case
of an amendment submitted by the board of directors of the corporation on its
own motion, and not more tban once every two years in the case of an amend-
ment submitted by the board of directors of the corporation pursuant to a share-
holder petition.
161. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (1982).
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amend its articles of incorporation once again to reimpose
restrictions at a future date by a majority vote of the share-
holders. 6 ' What the Natives were given through ANCSA,
complete ownership in the corporations that control the
land, will be lost forever. Moreover, a corporation that has
constantly operated at a loss and whose shareholders have
voted to implement the opt-out procedure may, with new
investors, become very successful and begin to operate at a
profit. The individual corporations may even start to pay out
dividends. Once this procedure is implemented, however, the
Natives cannot regain sole ownership of the corporation.
Rather, they must share in the ownership and the profits
with the new investors, as it will be virtually impossible for
them to generate sufficient capital to repurchase the shares
from non-Native owners.
C. The Recapitalization Plan
In addition to the opt-out procedure, the 1991 Amend-
ments provide each corporation with an option to implement
a recapitalization plan 6 ' which Congress believed would aid
in preserving the alienability restrictions provided in
ANCSA' 64 Congress allowed the regional corporations the
option of issuing different classes of stock in accordance with
this plan, which would carry with it disparate voting
rights.1
65
162. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). See also supra note 160 and
accompanying text. However, if a regional corporation has previously opted out of
continuing alienability restrictions, it is likely that those who voted in favor of
opting out would have already sold their shares to non-Natives. Non-Natives who
own shares in the regional corporations and who now have voting power are
unlikely to vote on an amendment .to reimpose restrictions, for it is their interests
that would be adversely affected.
163. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
164. S. REP. supra note 5, at 3282.
165. A corporation may adopt a recapitalization plan by amending its articles
of incorporation to extend restrictions indefinitely, or for a period of fifty years
or less with an option to extend this period. There is no limit on tle number of
such amendments that may be approved. In order to implement this plan, the
regional corporation must amend its articles of incorporation to provide for this
before December 18, 1991. If an amendment is rejected by a majority of the
shareholders, subsequent amendments may be voted on each year. A corporation
that votes to implement the recapitalization plan may amend its articles of incor-
poration at any time to terminate the plan. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c) (1982 & Supp. V
1987).
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This new stock issuance, called a recapitalization, is a
common way for corporations to restructure their capital.
Though a majority of shareholders may at any time termi-
nate the plan, fundamental problems arise once a corpora-
tion issues a new class of voting stock. The stockholders will
find themselves in grave danger of losing control to outside
investors, such as large petroleum corporations, if voting
alienable stock is issued to Native shareholders. It is unlikely
that a majority will vote to issue a new class of non-voting
alienable shares, as such shares will be unmarketable, particu-
larly for those who seek the shares in order to extract the
subsurface estate in the land.'66 If the shares have no vot-
ing power, they will be of no value to a potential investor in
such a situation. This is particularly threatening to those Na-
tive corporations with a high density of natural resources,
such as the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, NANA, Inc.,
and Doyon, Ltd., as the stock of these prosperous corpora-
tions will be in great demand. The petroleum companies will
exploit the land for monetary gain if they are given the right
to do so. More importantly, if these companies and other
outside investors gain a majority of the voting stock, they will
gain control of the corporations, and thus control all deci-
sions regarding the use of the land owned by these corpora-
tions. Once this happens, even should the Natives vote to
terminate the recapitalization plan, the regional corporations
will find it virtually impossible to call in the outstanding class
of shares created by this plan, particularly if non-Natives
constitute a majority of voting shareholders.
As with the opt-out approach, Natives who are discour-
aged with the failure of the corporate system may vote for
the recapitalization plan. Since the corporations may vote on
the proposal until December 18, 1991,67 it remains to be
seen how the individual corporations will act. Perhaps it will
depend upon the recent progress of the activity and invest-
ments of each individual corporation. However, once the
shareholders adopt this plan, and once a new class of voting
stock is created, it will be extremely difficult to remove such
166. If the shares have no voting power, they will be of no value to a poten-
tial investor in such a situation, as all decisions affecting tie future of tle land
will be made without their consideration.
167. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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restraints. If outside investors constitute a majority of voting
shareholders, perhaps an amendment to reinstate alienability
restrictions will never be implemented. Most importantly,
even should restrictions be reinstated, there will always be
the new class of shares outstanding, which cannot disappear
with an amendment. Congress, however, mistakenly reasoned
that this recapitalization plan would enable Native sharehold-
ers to maintain voting control while at the same time provid-
ing for stock liquidity. 6 '
Perhaps if petroleum companies and other outside inves-
tors acquire shares of stock and exploit the land, the corpo-
rations would become more profitable and would be in an
economically more advantageous position than they were
before the plan was implemented. The Natives, many of
whose corporations have never operated at a profit,
169
would be encouraged by the new revenue entering the cor-
poration, perhaps for the first time in twenty years. Many of
these Natives will not wish to vote for an amendment to
terminate the recapitalization plan, as long as they are shar-
ing in the wealth by receiving dividends. There is imminent
danger that disaffected Natives will vote for an amendment
to initiate the recapitalization plan, even at the expense of
the Natives losing control of the corporations that control
the land. For these reasons, the recapitalization option falls
far short of fulfilling the goal of Congress in striving to per-
manently settle the Alaska Native claims dispute.
D. The Opt-in Procedure
In addition to the opt-out approach and the recapitaliza-
tion plan, Congress has given each regional corporation the
option of adopting an opt-in procedure" in order to ex-
tend Native control over the corporations for another fifty
years. Once again, the original intent of Congress is not
satisfied in providing the Natives with the option of prolong-
168. Should a corporation wish to issue new shares of stock, those existing
shareholders would be forced to share the land expressly reserved for them under
the terms of ANCSA. Should the shareholders approve of this option, a new class
of alienable voting stock may be issued, replacing the original common stock
issued in 1971. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
169. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
170. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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ing their control in this manner. It is clear that through the
enactment of ANCSA, Congress hoped to settle the Native
claims dispute permanently, rapidly and efficiently. 7' How-
ever, this option, like the opt-out procedure and the recapi-
talization plan, does not achieve the goal that Congress had
intended. Rather, it simply postpones the solution to the
problem that ANCSA had tried to permanently settle in
1971. In 1971, Congress adopted a temporary solution to the
Native claims dispute. Twenty years later, Congress is once
again faced with settling the dispute.
The establishment of regional and village corporations by
ANCSA to benefit the Natives has failed. Because of the
economic failure of many of these corporations, the imple-
mentation of the corporate system has resulted in many dis-
couraged and disheartened Natives. Many of these Natives,
perhaps a majority, will not wish to vote to extend these
restrictions. If they are to survive, a change in investment is
needed by these corporations that would result in the gen-
eration of capital. This is the only way that the Natives see
to change the direction of the corporations. The safest man-
ner in which the Natives will be able to effectuate this is to
allow in new, experienced investors, including corporations,
who will be able to generate capital and make a profit. The
opt-in approach fails to protect Native interests, because the
failure of the corporate system implemented by ANCSA has
given the disheartened Native shareholders the incentive to
let the alienability restrictions expire. This would create an
irreversible loss, a result that Congress had not intended.
The opt-in procedure applies to all regional corporations,
and to village corporations, urban corporations'72  and
group corporations 7 1 within the Aleut Corporation and
171. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (1982).
172. The term "urban corporation" describes an Alaska Native corporation
organized under the Alaska state law "as a business for profit or nonprofit corpo-
ration to hold, invest, manage and/or distribute lands, property, funds, and other
rights and assets for and on belalf of members of an urban community of Na-
tives in accordance with Lhe terms of [ANCSA]." 43 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (1982 &
Supp. V 1987).
173. A "[g]roup [c]orporation" is an Alaska Native Group Corporation "orga-
nized under the laws of the State of Alaska as a business for profit or nonprofit
corporation to hold, invest, manage and/or distribute lands, property, funds, and
other rights and assets for and on behalf of members of a Native group in
accordance with the terms of [ANCSA]." 43 U.S.C. § 1602(n) (1982 & Supp. V
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Bristol Bay Region. The option is only available to a corpora-
tion whose board of directors elects to avail the corporation
of the opportunity. 74 Should it do so, the shareholders
must affirmatively vote to extend the restrictions beyond
1991..'" If a majority does not vote to extend the restric-
tions, they will automatically expire on December 18,
1991.176
If the shareholders do not vote to extend restrictions
before December 18, 1991, they will not have a chance for
another vote.'7 7 This option is indeed a threatening one.
As aforementioned, many Natives are disheartened and dis-
couraged with the corporate system. Many wish to sell their
shares and finally receive some capital from their ownership,
which they should have received had their corporations been
profitable. After twenty discouraging years, many Natives see
1991 as a time to finally make their ownership benefit them.
The only way the Natives believe that this will happen is for
them to have liquid stock. Many wish to have the option to
sell their shares if they so choose, and finally receive the
return that they had hoped for long ago.
Many Natives, however, realize that if they sell their
shares for money, and thus completely relinquish their inter-
est in the corporation, they will have nothing left from the
settlement. They will no longer be tied to the land that they
believe is rightfully theirs, hence nothing will be left for their
children. Many Natives do not wish to see control of their
land slip through their hands because of some hasty or
short-sighted decisions. Once they lose their ownership inter-
est in the corporations that control their land, the cultural
identity that they have struggled to maintain will be lost as
well.
With each of the three alternatives provided to the re-
gional corporations, the problem lies in the 1991 lifting of
the restraints on alienation. Undoubtedly, if the Natives'
1987).
174. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(l)(A) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
175. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(d)(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
176. If the shareholders do not vote for the opt-in procedure, the board of
directors may resubmit the issue once or more per year before December 18,
1991. If the shareholders do not vote to extend the restrictions before 1991, they
will be forever lost. Id.
177. Id.
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stock becomes freely alienable, there will be an abundance of
ready buyers. Alaska, because of its wealth of natural resourc-
es, has the richest land in the United States. Investors are
eagerly awaiting December 18, 1991, and they will be willing
to pay an extremely high price if they must to acquire con-
trol of these valuable lands.
The Natives willing to sell their shares are also awaiting
the day that the restrictions will be lifted. December 18, 1991
will be for them a day of dubious salvation; the day that they
will sell their shares, and with them, everything that their
ancestors have founded and fought to keep.
IV. PROPOSAL
Another Congressional amendment to solve the critical
problem of Native corporate control is vital. The greatest
danger to the continued Native land ownership is the threat
of corporate takeover by powerful non-Native investors, espe-
cially large petroleum corporations, who wish to exploit the
land for their own profit. Once they gain control of the cor-
porations, they will control all decisions that will affect the
future of the land and the Natives will have lost control of
the land forever.
This problem poses a conflict between individual Native
rights and group rights. Clearly, some Natives wish to be
able to sell their stock and receive any monetary benefits
that will be realized upon its disposition. However, one must
view the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act as a settlement
not exclusively for those alive on December 18, 1971, but as
a settlement based on years of Native land occupation, and
one that was designed to serve future generations of Alaska
Natives.'7 8 If one views ANCSA in this light, it is clear that
further restrictions ought to be placed on the future disposi-
tion of stock to non-Natives.
The corporate form of ownership may be successful if
sufficient capital is generated through the leasing of subsur-
face estates in the land owned by the corporations. Because
oil and other natural resources have an extremely high eco-
nomic value when extracted, the subsurface rights in the land
are the most valuable to the Natives. The capital paid into
178. Shively, supra note 147, at L-8.
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the corporations in the form of royalties can then be rein-
vested in the corporations to provide for the health, educa-
tion, and welfare needs of the Native shareholders.
Though the purpose of the settlement trust option set
forth in Section 1629e is to promote the health, education,
and welfare for its beneficiaries, it does not provide for the
adequate generation of capital to be able to succeed at this
endeavor.' 79 Congress must enact legislation that will ac-
commodate the wishes of the Alaska Natives, while at the
same time solve the problems that have been created
through the 1971 passage of ANCSA. This remedy should
take the form of a further amendment to ANCSA that would
allow each shareholder to freely alienate his or her interest
to the surface rights to the land, should the shareholder so
choose. Furthermore, this legislation must also provide that a
Native shareholder may never alienate his or her shares to
the subsurface rights.8
The legislation should allow all non-Native investors who
acquire shares to be free to extract the natural resources
from beneath the surface. Clearly, the companies would be
subject to certain restrictions implemented by each corpora-
tion, as the subsurface rights would still be controlled by the
Natives through their ownership in the individual corpora-
tions. Regulations restricting subsurface extraction are neces-
sary to ensure that the natural resources will not be com-
pletely exhausted, and land would not be rendered useless.
This amendment would accomplish the original purpose of
ANCSA: a fair, rapid, and just settlement of the Native
claims controversy.'8 '
An effective amendment would read as follows:
179. It is the capital generated from the extracted subsurface resources that
will enable the corporations to produce income. This income will enable the
corporations to revive and prosper. Because of this, it is necessary to provide for
the lease of these subsurface estates.
180. The restraints on alienation imposed upon the Natives will not be held to
violate the equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Such challenges to the manner in which the federal govern-
ment deals with American Indians have been uniformly rejected by the United
States Supreme Court. It has been held to be sufficient that a classification is
rationally related to Congress' trust responsibility to the Indians generally. Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), Alaska Chapter, Associated General Contractors
v. Pierce, 694 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).
181. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (1982).
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1. Section 1629c of the 1991 Amendments is hereby
repealed with respect to the subsurface rights to land
owned by village and regional corporations. Section
1629c shall still apply with regard to surface rights of all
land. Alienability restrictions to surface land shall contin-
ue until terminated in accordance with the procedures
established in this section. No such termination shall take
effect until after December 18, 1991.
2. Alienability restrictions to subsurface estates in
land owned by the regional corporations shall continue
in perpetuity. Regional corporations may, however, lease
the rights to subsurface land, subject to such restrictions
as each corporation shall implement by a vote of the
shareholders in accordance with § 1629b.
3. Regional corporations leasing the rights to subsur-
face land may require the lessee to pay royalties to the
lessor corporation, either through a percentage of the
amount of land use or a percentage of the value of ma-
terials extracted. The method of royalty payment shall be
set forth in an amendment to the articles of incorpora-
tion, to be implemented by a vote of the shareholders in
accordance with § 1629b.
4. Each regional corporation, by a vote of the share-
holders in accordance with § 1629b, may amend its arti-
cles of incorporation to require that all royalties paid
into the corporation for the extraction of natural resourc-
es by lessees shall be reinvested to promote the health,
education, and welfare of the corporate shareholders,
and to preserve the heritage and the culture of the Na-
tive shareholders. This amendment shall not discriminate
in favor of a group of individuals composed only or
principally of employees, officers, or directors of the
regional corporation.
5. Each regional corporation may amend its articles
of incorporation by a vote of the shareholders in accor-
dance with § 1629b to allow for the issuance of new
stock to those born after December 18, 1971, who are
living at the time of the amendment. Subsequent amend-
ments allowing for the issuance of new stock may be
considered and voted on not earlier than five years after
the date of the previous amendment. The amendment
may provide that the new stock will be issued without
compensation to the original stockholders.
6. The interests created by the proposed amend-
ments shall not be held to violate any laws against perpe-
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tuities.
If a certain monetary amount, set forth in the articles of
incorporation, is reinvested into the corporation and used to
promote the health, education, and welfare of the Native
shareholders, the corporations will operate at a maximum
efficiency level. Because of the vast quantity of natural re-
sources that would be extracted, an ever increasing amount
of revenue would revert to the corporations. This, clearly,
will put the staggering corporations back on their feet and
renew the Native's optimism that has long been missing.
V. CONCLUSION
The passage of ANCSA and the 1991 Amendments
brought new hope to the Alaska Natives. The Natives be-
lieved that the federal government granted them the land to
which they were entitled, once and for all settling the diffi-
cult Native land claims controversy. Twenty years later, how-
ever, the Natives recognize that ANCSA has failed them. The
purpose of Congress, they realize, is at odds with their own
goals. Understanding this, through the 1991 Amendments,
Congress gave the individual regional corporations one of
three options to maintain the corporate form of ownership
and to extend Native control over their corporations: the
opt-out procedure, the recapitalization plan, and the opt-in
procedure. However, each of these options fails to fulfill the
original intent of Congress. The lifting of the restraints on
alienation will certainly subject this land to loss, unless Con-
gress prevents this through permanent legislation. The Na-
tives do not wish to keep alive the possibility that their land
may someday be forever lost. They seek the security of know-
ing that they will always be able to keep their land, and will
be able to pass it on to their children, for the majority of
Natives view the settlement as one that was designed for
future generations of Alaskan Natives. As one Native plead-
ed, "We are not begging. We're asking for respect for our
land, for our people. We were brought to this island many
years ago. Please don't take it from us."" 2
Kathleen A. Nelson
182. T. BERGER, supra note 25, at 18.
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